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The interference of the Courts with the performance
of the ordinary duties of the executive departments
of the government, would be productive of nothing
but mischief; and we are quite satisfied that such a
power was never intended to be given to them.'
That is what the Supreme Court said, in an ear-
lier century, about the idea that courts might review
agency decisions. In this century, the second part of
this observation no longer holds. Power to review
Federal Communications Commission decisions, for
example, has been given to the courts, especially to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit. This change, many an FCC Chairman
has no doubt concluded, proves the first part of the
Supreme Court's observation to be all too true.
There is indeed a fine tension between the FCC
and the D.C. Circuit. The FCC is institutionally in-
terested in expanding to the greatest possible extent
the scope of its discretion. The D.C. Circuit maxi-
mizes its utility precisely to the extent it holds the
FCC's expansion of discretion in check. This tension
is aggravated by the unusual intimacy the court
shares with the FCC. An overwhelming majority of
appeals from FCC decisions are taken to the D.C.
Circuit, and perhaps half of these cases are required
by the Communications Act to be there. Thus, the
court is closely familiar with the FCC's work, a fa-
miliarity which often tempts it to believe that it can
produce better results. In this article we will explore
this unusual relationship; how it came to exist, how
it has developed over the years, especially in re-
sponse to Supreme Court mandates, and where it
stands today.
I. ORIGINS OF THE RELATIONSHIP
How did D.C. Circuit review of FCC decisions
come to be? There is nothing intuitively obvious
1 Mr. Hirrel is a member of the District of Columbia and
Florida bars. Mr. Hirrel was in private practice, concentrating
in appellate matters, at the time this article was submitted. He is
co-chair of the Judicial Practice Committee of the Federal Coin-
about court review of agency decisions. The Supreme
Court's early decisions like Decatur, quoted at the
outset, attest to this. Even in the great case of Mar-
bury v. Madison,' where the Court compelled the
Secretary of State to issue justice of the peace com-
missions to persons who had been nominated and
confirmed, the Court stressed that this ministerial
duty was already imposed on the Secretary by stat-
ute. The Court denied that it had power to review
discretionary actions of executive officers. The reason
for the Court's reticence is easy to understand.
Agency actions are necessarily political." Agencies
apply policy at least partly determined by the politi-
cal process. Courts, in contrast, are not and cannot
be in the policy business.
Perhaps even less obvious is the structure of
agency review. In most of its important cases, the
FCC decides among the competing interests of pri-
vate parties. The process very much resembles pri-
vate party litigation in trial court. But when a party
is disappointed by the FCC's decision, it sues on ap-
peal not the litigation's winner, but the FCC itself.
Winners are relegated to intervenor status. On the
surface, this procedure makes little sense. Losers in
civil cases do not sue on appeal the trial court judge,
who then defends his decision while the winner
stands by. Yet, this procedure is so firmly entrenched
in agency cases that in one oral argument I wit-
nessed before the D.C. Circuit, when FCC counsel
permitted intervenor's counsel to argue first on ap-
pellee's side, the judges objected and required inter-
venor's counsel to sit down.
The answers to these mysteries lie in the origins of
the modern administrative state. As Marbury made
clear, federal courts have always held power in eq-
uity to enjoin or set aside executive action that vio-
lates the constitution or federal statute. This power
did not, however, comprise a direct power to review
agency decisions. A somewhat more direct system of
munications Bar.
' Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 497, 516 (1840).
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4 Id. at 170.
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review emerged with the passage of the original In-
terstate Commerce Act in 1887.6 The Interstate
Commerce Commission was authorized to seek en-
forcement of its orders in U.S. District Courts.
These enforcement proceedings in practice often
turned upon a review of the record compiled by the
ICC.6
The ICC's inability to enforce its orders except
through this cumbersome process left the agency
rather impotent. Congress set out to correct this
problem in 1906 in the Hepburn Act.7 The
Hepburn Act gave the ICC substantial enforcement
powers. To counterbalance the possibility that the
ICC might act arbitrarily, however, the Hepburn
Act also specifically authorized affected parties to
bring actions in equity against the ICC "to enjoin,
set aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part any"
ICC order.' The decendent of this provision survives
today as section 402(a) of the Communications Act.
In cases brought under this provision of the
Hepburn Act, the courts soon modified the tradi-
tional action in equity to include direct review of
ICC decisions. At first this modification proceeded
upon a legal fiction; even when ICC decisions were
authorized by the literal terms of the Commerce Act,
they were held to be unauthorized by the statute if
they were "unreasonable" or "arbitrary." "[I]n
truth," the Supreme Court explained, arbitrary or
unreasonable actions fall "within the elementary
rule that the substance, and not the shadow, deter-
mines the validity of the exercise of the power." 9
The courts gradually dropped this fiction. Agency
decisions could be set aside, the Supreme Court held,
simply because they were "arbitrary or capricious"
or not supported by "substantial evidence. '1
The Hepburn Act authorized actions in equity
against the ICC to be taken in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. Four years later, in 1910, Congress
changed this venue. The change was to foreshadow
much of the future interaction between the FCC and
the D.C. Circuit. In the Mann-Elkins Act, Congress
established a specialized court of appeals, the Com-
merce Court, to review ICC decisions."1 The crea-
An Act to Regulate Commerce, Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
• See J. CHAMBERLAIN, ET. AL., THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
IN FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, 166 (1942).
' The Hepburn Amendment to an Act to Regulate Com-
merce, Ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
I ld.
ICC v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 215 U.S. 452, 470 (1910); See
also ICC v. Union Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541, 547 (1912).
10 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond &
Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 277 (1933); Silberschein v. U.S.,
266 U.S. 221, 225 (1924).
tion of a specialized court was vigorously protested
by many in Congress. They argued that such a court
would naturally tend to usurp discretion that right-
fully belongs to the agency."2 These predictions
proved correct. In its three years of existence, the
Commerce Court set aside ICC orders with startling
frequency. And just as frequently it was reversed by
the Supreme Court for failure to show proper defer-
ence to the agency. Of the Commerce Court's twelve
decisions reviewed by the Supreme Court, ten were
reversed."
Faced with this sorry record, Congress abolished
the Commerce Court in 1913. Congress transferred
authority to review ICC orders to the U.S. District
Courts. The District Courts were for this purpose
constituted as three-judge courts, with a presiding
judge from the relevant circuit court. Appeals from
the District Court decisions were taken directly to
the Supreme Court. This structure remained in exis-
tence for review of ICC orders until 1975, when ju-
risdiction was transferred to the Courts of Appeals.
The 1913 statute creating the structure was known
as the Urgent Deficiencies Act. 4
The Urgent Deficiencies Act was explicitly incor-
porated into the Communications Act in 1934 as the
means for review of all FCC orders other than those
that concerned radio licenses. Before 1934, the ICC
held some regulatory power over interstate commu-
nications common carriers under the 1910 Mann-El-
kins Act. This power was exercised by the ICC only
sporadically, a fact which influenced Congress to
create a unified communications commission. But the
FCC's heritage in the ICC led Congress to adopt for
the FCC the same method by which ICC orders
were reviewed. 5 As a result, FCC orders other than
those concerning radio licenses were, until 1950, re-
viewed by special three-judge district courts.
In 1950, Congress returned the FCC to the venue
originally set out by the Hepburn Act for review of
ICC orders. Review of FCC orders other than those
for radio licenses was transferred to the U.S. Courts
of Appeals. 6 This method of review still stands to-
day in section 402(a) of the Communications Act."7
" 49 U.S.C. § 10301, et seq.
R. Cushman, The Independent Regulatory Commissions,
1941, pp. 89-90, 92-95.
is Id. at 103-04.
14 October 6, 1913, Ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219-221.
'a See M. PAGLIN, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COM-
MUNICATIONS AcT OF 1934, 719-20 (1989).
10 December 29, 1950, Ch. 1189, 64 Stat. 1129. This statute
was originally incorporated into the U.S. Code at 5 U.S.C.
§ 1032. Its successor today is 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1994).
17 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). Section 402(a) cross references 28
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Petitioners for review under section 402(a) may of
course seek review in their own circuit as well as the
D.C. Circuit. But for reasons to be suggested below,
a good majority of these petitions are taken to the
D.C. Circuit.
The D.C. Circuit has exclusive authority to re-
view FCC orders that concern radio licenses. This
authority is set out in detail in section 402(b) of the
Communications Act."8  Appeals under section
402(b) comprise probably half of the FCC's appel-
late docket. They include the vast majority of ap-
peals related to broadcasting and private radio, and
many appeals from common carrier decisions, such
as those concerning cellular, mobile radio, and satel-
lite authorizations. This exclusive jurisdiction over
radio licensing cases goes to the heart of the special
relationship between the FCC and the D.C. Circuit.
The nature of this special relationship was clearly
anticipated by Congress when it passed the Radio
Act ("Radio Act") in 1927.19
The Radio Act created the system of construction
permits, licenses, modifications and renewal of radio
licenses that still prevails today under Title III of the
Communications Act. Responsibilities held today by
the FCC were assigned by the Radio Act to the Fed-
eral Radio Commission ("FRC"). If the FRC de-
nied an application, section 16 of the Radio Act
granted the applicant a right of appeal. Exclusive ju-
risdiction over these appeals was given to the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, predecessor
to the D.C. Circuit. The Court of Appeals not only
was given exclusive jurisdiction but also was granted
authority to take additional evidence, and, perhaps
most strikingly, to "alter or revise the decision ap-
pealed from and enter such judgment as to it may
seem just."20
The debate in Congress over this provision shows
that this striking grant of power to the Court of Ap-
peals was more or less intentional. Congress feared
that the FRC would act arbitrarily in making licens-
ing decisions. Congress wanted to curb the agency's
power. Speaking for the minority, Senator Albert
Cummins argued that no appeal should be permitted
from FRC licensing decisions because applicants
have no inherent rights in the radio spectrum. Li-
censing decisions, he reasoned, were thus necessarily
U.S.C. § 2342, which lays out the specific terms as to how re-
view is taken.
is 47 U.S.C. § 402(b).
19 49 U.S.C. § 81, et seq.
20 Id.
21 67 CONG. REC. 12,354 (1926).
22 Id. at 12,355.
committed to the Commission's discretion. Appeals
from them would only impede the Commission's
work.
2 1
A majority of the Senate disagreed, however. Sen-
ator Joseph Robinson, who introduced the amend-
ment, argued that a right of appeal is necessary be-
cause "it frequently happens the commissions act
arbitrarily." A citizen needs to know, he continued,
that when he "is being deprived of his rights by the
arbitrary action of a governmental agency, he may
have his case heard and his right determined finally
by a court. ... . Senator William King pro-
nounced himself "astounded" by Senator Cummins'
position. "I cannot conceive of a measure of this
character," he explained, "with a board having such
arbitrary power, not affording an opportunity for a
"523judicial review of the proceedings ... .
Senator Cummins also contended that the statute's
right to appeal to a court the decisions of an admin-
istrative agency violated the federal constitution. In
this contention, Cummins was proved partially cor-
rect. In its first FRC case, the Supreme Court held
that it lacked jurisdiction to review decisions of the
D.C. Court of Appeals in FRC cases. The Court
cited in particular the Court of Appeals' authority to
take additional evidence and to revise FRC deci-
sions.2 " This authority, the Court held, is an admin-
istrative function, and makes the Court of Appeals
"no more than ... a superior and revising agency in
the same field."'25 Such authority may be exercised
by the courts of the District of Columbia, because
they are legislative creations, but it may not be exer-
cised by Article III courts.2 6 Thus, the Supreme
Court could not review decisions rendered pursuant
to such a grant of authority. 7
Congress had not intended to disable the Supreme
Court from performing its traditional role. Congress
quickly revised the Radio Act's appeal section to
strike the provisions that had caused this result. The
Court of Appeals could no longer take evidence or
revise the FRC's decisions. It was now confined to
"questions of law." The FRC's findings of fact, "if
supported by substantial evidence," were deemed to
be "conclusive unless it shall clearly appear that the
findings . . . are arbitrary or capricious. '2 8 In its
next FRC case, the Supreme Court declared itself
28 Id. at 12,508.
2 Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281
U.S. 464 (1930).
25 Id. at 467.
26 Id. at 468-69.
27 Id. at 469.
28 46 Stat. 788, 845 (1930).
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satisfied with these changes. The Court of Appeals'
authority, as revised, concerns only "the legal ques-
tion whether the commission has acted within the
limits of its authority."29 An appeal on this question
is "a case or controversy which is the appropriate
subject of the exercise of judicial power."'
In 1934, the Radio Act's appeal section was incor-
porated with only minor revision into the 1934 Act
as Section 402(b). Over the subsequent years, some
changes have been made in the types of licensing ac-
tions covered by the provision, but review of these
actions by the D.C. Court of Appeals, and later the
D.C. Circuit, has remained a stable feature of sec-
tion 402(b).
This brief history provides a surprisingly clear an-
swer to the questions we asked at the outset. Judicial
review of FCC decisions, and particularly review by
the D.C. Circuit, came about as a reaction to the
growing power of administrative agencies. As agen-
cies' power expanded in the early years of the 20th
century, the courts gradually assumed authority to
restrain arbitrary agency action. This authority was
first applied to decisions of the ICC, an application
which was carried forward in the Communications
Act under Section 402(a). When Congress created
the FRC, it worried specifically about the FRC's
power to make decisions arbitrarily. Congress inten-
tionally created in the D.C. Court of Appeals a
strong counterbalance to the FRC's, and later the
FCC's, power.
Agencies defend their own decisions on appeal be-
cause of the way court review came about. The
agencies themselves were hauled into court, initially
as defendants in actions for injunctions. They had no
choice but to defend themselves. This practice was
sufficiently well established by 1927 that Congress
apparently did not even consider any other possibil-
ity with respect to appeals of FRC decisions. In ad-
dition, a practical consideration underlay this ap-
proach. Today we think of the FCC largely as an
arbiter of competing private interests. In their early
days, however, the ICC, the FRC, and the FCC it-
self were expected to, and did, balance private inter-
ests solely against the public interest. When the com-
missions made decisions on this basis, private parties
often did not exist to defend the decisions.
'9 FRC v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S.
266, 278 (1933).
80 Id.
" Several of the Supreme Court's most important opinions
concerning the relationship of the courts and the executive
branch, such as FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.




The above history highlights a tension in the rela-
tionship between the D.C. Court of Appeals and the
FRC that has persisted as the relationship has un-
folded over the years. At the very outset, Congress
was of two minds about what it wanted from the re-
lationship. It wanted a strong court to check arbi-
trary action by the FRC. But when the Supreme
Court shunned a similar role for itself, Congress re-
moved the provisions in the Radio Act that made the
Court of Appeals "a superior and revising agency."
Instead, the statute explicitly confined the Court of
Appeals to "questions of law." Thus, Congress
wants the Court to be a strong court, but one con-
fined to questions of law. Delineating the area of
permissible overlap between these contradictory
goals is a problem that has vexed the Court ever
since.
The Court of Appeals has always been fairly con-
sistent in aggressively intervening in FCC matters,
but the objects of its intervention have varied. From
1927 until the 1960s, the Court regularly interceded
against the FRC or FCC on behalf of incumbent
broadcast licensees. The Court was, however, fre-
quently reversed by the Supreme Court. By the
1940s, in particular, the Supreme Court was con-
trolled by New Deal appointees. They firmly be-
lieved in the wisdom of government by administra-
tive experts. 1 They had little tolerance for lower
courts who insisted on meddling in the business of
expert agencies.
The Court of Appeals' troubles with the Supreme
Court began at the beginning in FRC v. Nelson
Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co.. 82 The FRC had
granted an application for a new radio station in
Gary, Indiana. To accommodate the new station, the
FRC ordered two Chicago stations off the air, refus-
ing to renew their temporary licenses. The Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that the FRC had arbi-
trarily failed to consider various equities held by the
Chicago stations. The Supreme Court demurred.
"[T]he weight of ... these equities," it held, "is for
the determination of the commission. . ... 8 The
FRC was entitled to consider the factors it did in
Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter had long passionately embraced
the idea of government by administrative experts, both as a bu-
reaucrat himself and as a law professor. See MICHAEL E. PAR-
RISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND His TIMES, 36, 43-46, 200-02
(1982).




making its decision. 4
In succeeding years, efforts by the Court of Ap-
peals to substitute its conclusions for those of the
Commission met similar fates. In FCC v. WOKO,
Inc., 5 for example, the FCC denied a license re-
newal to a station where owners had misrepresented
facts to the FCC. The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the FCC failed to consider the quality
of the station's service and the immateriality of the
falsehoods. Again, the Supreme Court disagreed:
"[lIt is the Commission, not the courts which must
be satisfied that the public interest will be served by
renewing the license. And the fact that we might not
have made the same determination on the same facts
does not warrant a substitution of judicial for admin-
istrative discretion." 6
Sometimes when the Court of Appeals was un-
happy with the FCC's results, it imposed upon the
Commission, not different outcomes, but additional
procedural requirements. The Supreme Court was
equally hostile here. It canceled the following proce-
dures ordered by the Court of Appeals: A hearing on
whether a station would be harmed by grant of a
permit for another station to move to the same com-
munity; s7 an oral argument on whether a clear chan-
nel station would suffer interference from a new co-
channel station; 8 and a right to hearings for multi-
ple station owners who applied for additional sta-
tions beyond the number permitted by the FCC's
rules.3 9
Perhaps the defining early case concerning the re-
lationship between the Court of Appeals and the
FCC is FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co.'0 In
Pottsville, the FCC had found an applicant finan-
cially unqualified, a decision which the Court of Ap-
peals had reversed.4 1 On remand, the FCC combined
the disputed application with two others for compar-
ative consideration. 4'2 The Court issued a writ of
mandamus, holding that its prior mandate reversing
the denial required the FCC to grant the applica-
tion.43 Once again, however, the Supreme Court in-
84 Id. at 285-86.
85 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
36 Id. at 229.
" FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
(1940).
", FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Stations, Inc., 337 U.S. 265,
272-73 (1949).
"' FCC v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 206
(1956).
40 309 U.S. 134 (1940).
41 Id. at 139.
42 Id. at 140.
43 Id.
tervened. In sweeping language, it stressed the lim-
ited role of courts in reviewing agency actions. The
Court of Appeals merely corrects legal error; once it
does that, it has "exhausted the only power which
Congress gave it."'44 It may not interfere with the
FCC's public interest judgments."5
In the modern era, beginning in the 1960s, the
scope of the D.C. Circuit's cases has expanded con-
siderably. The Court is still called upon to review
cases brought by incumbent licensees unhappy with
FCC regulatory actions. But just as often it must
also consider cases brought by other industry parties
or members of the public who argue that the FCC
has not been active enough. And of course the
Court's case load has expanded far beyond its earlier
concentration in broadcast cases. The Court consid-
ers licensing cases in many radio services in addition
to broadcast, and, through section 402(a) petitions
for review, a wide variety of appeals in cases that do
not even concern radio licensing.
The Court continues to play an active role in
FCC cases, although the nature of its intervention
has changed. Even when the Court is unhappy with
the FCC's results, it almost never simply substitutes
its judgment for that of the FCC in the bold fashion
it did in the 1930s. And, with the passage of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act in 1946, the Court no
longer may require the FCC to follow additional
procedures devised by the Court. The Supreme
Court made this clear in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC."' Nevertheless, the Court
has continued to make its presence felt, reversing
FCC decisions on narrower and more technical
grounds.
Occasionally, the D.C. Circuit still reaches beyond
the restricted role assigned to it by the Supreme
Court. This tendency manifested itself in paradig-
matic fashion in a series of decisions in the 1970s
concerning changes of radio station program for-
mats. 47 In each case, a prospective purchaser pro-
posed to change the station's format. Existing for-
44 Id.
48 The sweep of Pottsville was substantially cut back twelve
years later when Congress passed Section 402(h), which directs
the FCC to carry out a reviewing court's mandate, unless other-
wise authorized by the court, based on the prior record and pro-
ceedings. 47 U.S.C. § 402(h).
4e 435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978).
,' Joseph v. FCC, 404 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Citizens
Committee to Preserve the Present Programming of the "Voice
of the Arts in Atlanta on WGNA-AM & FM" v. FCC, 436
F.2d 263 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hartford Communications Commit-
tee v. FCC, 467 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Citizens Committee
to Keep Progressive Rock v. FCC, 478 F.2d 926 (D.C. Cir.
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mats often were unique in the markets-classical
music and jazz were typical-and the new proposed
formats were arguably already offered by other sta-
tions. Devotees of the existing formats asked the
FCC to deny the transfer applications. The FCC
stoutly resisted these petitions. Initially, the FCC re-
fused to consider the issue, reasoning that the format
is committed to licensee discretion. 48 After the Court
reversed these decisions, the FCC found that pro-
posed format changes met the criteria specified by
the Court.
The D.C. Circuit was almost equally tenacious in
reversing the FCC. It held that the FCC must con-
sider the availability of formats to the listening pub-
lic when it decides whether proposed transfers serve
the public interest. When a viable format will be lost
in a market, the Court held, the FCC must weigh
that loss in a hearing. Frustrated by the Court's te-
nacity, the FCC finally threw down the gauntlet.
Using rulemaking procedures, the Commission is-
sued a notice of inquiry. Then, the Commission
adopted a blanket policy statement holding that it
would no longer involve itself in program format de-
cisions. 49 The Commission found that format deci-
sions are made most efficiently in the marketplace,
and stressed the many practical difficulties of in-
serting itself into these decisions.
Again, the D.C. Circuit reversed.50 This time,
however, the Supreme Court granted certiorari; it
reversed the Court of Appeals and fully acquitted
the FCC." The Supreme Court observed that the
FCC's "judgment regarding how the public interest
is best served is entitled to substantial judicial defer-
ence. . . . The Commission's implementation of the
public interest standard, when based on a rational
weighing of competing policies, is not to be set aside
1973); Lakewood Broadcasting Service, Inc. v. FCC, 478 F.2d
919 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v.
FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc).
48 Voice of the Arts in Atlanta, 436 F.2d 263, 267-68.
" In Re Development of Policy Re: Changes in the En-
tertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations, Memorandum Opin-
ion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976).
50 WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838, 858
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc).
' FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 604
(1981).
52 Id. at 596.
's TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (FCC
failure to accord additional merit in comparative hearing for
partial minority ownership of television applicant); Garrett v.
FCC, 513 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FCC failure to consider
station's minority ownership as a factor supporting waiver of
coverage rule in application for nighttime broadcasting author-
ity); Gottfried v. FCC, 655 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (de-
by the Court of Appeals. .... 52
Another area in which the D.C. Circuit may have
too exuberantly imposed its own preferences upon
the FCC involves policies favoring minorities,
women, and the disabled. Ironically, the Court and
the FCC have over the years switched policy prefer-
ences in this area. The Court in the 1970s reversed
the FCC for failing to adopt rules favoring these
groups.53 The Court's last such decision required the
FCC to consider in license renewal proceedings the
allegedly inadequate efforts of noncommercial televi-
sion stations to accommodate the needs of the hear-
ing impaired. This decision was reversed by the Su-
preme Court. 4 In the 1980s, the D.C. Circuit took
the opposite tack. Although it did affirm a minority
preference policy in comparative broadcast hearings,
it reversed the FCC for adopting a similar prefer-
ence for women, and for authorizing licensees in re-
newal trouble to sell their stations at a discount to
minorities." The latter decision was again reversed
by the Supreme Court. " '
The D.C. Circuit's tendency to impose its policy
preferences upon the FCC has abated noticeably
since 1980. The Court now generally takes a more
cautious, more deferential, approach when FCC ap-
peals are based on policy-oriented arguments. Even
so, a reversion to the Court's old habits may be seen
in a series of recent decisions striking down the
FCC's "integration" preference in comparative
broadcast hearings.5" That preference favors appli-
cants who propose to work in management level po-
sitions at the stations for which they are applying.
The FCC has essentially made a predictive judgment
that stations operated by owner-managers will better
serve their communities." The Court is unwilling to
accept the FCC's predictive judgment. It seems to in-
scribed infra).
" Community Television of S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 454 U.S.
1141 (1983).
55 West Michigan Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (comparative hearing preference); Winter Park
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 873 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(comparative hearing preference); Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d
382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (women's preference); Shurberg Broad-
casting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
("distress sale" policy for licensees in renewal trouble).
" Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 600
(1990); but see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, U.S. S. Ct.
No. 93-1841, dec. June 12, 1995.
"' Bechtel v. FCC, 957 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Flagstaff Broadcasting Foundation v. FCC, 979 F.2d 1566, 1571
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Bechtel v. FCC, 10 F.3d 875, 887 (D.C. Cir.
1993).
" See, e.g., Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast
Hearings, order 1 F.C.C.2d 393, para. (1965).
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sist upon hard evidence. Such evidence may be, how-
ever, for purely practical reasons, impossible to
secure.
Apart from policy-oriented cases, the D.C. Cir-
cuit's active supervision of the FCC in the modern
era has often proved to be fully necessary. The
Court plays a vital role in correcting the FCC's fre-
quent and persistent procedural lapses. It has, for
example, repeatedly interceded on behalf of appli-
cants whose applications were dismissed for failing
to comply with standards of which the FCC had
provided no notice.59 In addition, the Court has often
needed to remind the FCC that a hearing is required
in licensing proceedings when a substantial and ma-
terial question of fact arises."0
The Court similarly serves a necessary function in
requiring the FCC to stay within the limits of its
statutory authority. Typical of this role is the
Court's decade long conflict with the agency over the
filing of tariffs. The Communications Act specifies
that "[e]very common carrier . . . shall . . . file . . .
schedules showing all charges"; "No carrier," the
Act continues, "shall engage" in communications
service unless these tariffs have been filed. 6 Not-
withstanding these seemingly unambiguous com-
mands, the FCC began in 1982 to excuse many car-
riers from the tariff filing requirement. It relied
upon its statutory authority to "modify" the tariffing
sections requirements, "either in particular instances
or . . . special circumstances." 2 Those decisions
were not immediately appealed.
In 1985, the FCC went a step further and re-
quired almost all carriers to withdraw their tariffs.
This decision was appealed, and the D.C. Circuit re-
versed.8 3 The Court found that the FCC's modifica-
tion authority does not sanction "wholesale abandon-
ment or elimination of a requirement."6 Several
years later, AT&T used several procedural mecha-
nisms to challenge the FCC's decisions excusing ri-
"' Radio Athens, Inc. v. FCC, 401 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir.
1968); Salzer v. FCC, 778 F.2d 869, 871-72 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Maxcell Telecom Plus, Inc. v. FCC, 815 F.2d 1551, 1557, 1560
(D.C. Cir. 1987); Satellite Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 824
F.2d 1, 2 (D.C. Cir. 1987); McElroy Electronics Corp. v. FCC,
990 F.2d 1351, 1563 (1993); Glaser v. FCC, 20 F.3d 1184,
1188 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
" Citizens for Jazz on WRVR v. FCC, 775 F.2d 392, 395
(D.C. Cir. 1985); Astroline Communications Co. v. FCC, 857
F.2d 1556, 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1988); David Ortiz Radio Corp. v.
FCC, 941 F.2d 1253, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
01 47 U.S.C. § 203 (a) and (c) (1988).
*' 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1988).
*8 MCI Telecommunications v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
val carriers from filing tariffs. The FCC rebuffed
these challenges. When the cases reached the D.C.
Circuit, the Court, relying on its earlier decision, re-
versed again. 6 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari, and, perhaps for the first time, affirmed the
Court of Appeals' reversal of the FCC." The FCC's
modification authority, the Supreme Court con-
firmed, "does not contemplate fundamental
changes.""7
In response to AT&T's success in the Court of
Appeals, the FCC began a new rulemaking proceed-
ing. It adopted rules allowing most carriers to file
tariffs specifying rate ranges rather than particular
rates. The FCC insisted that customers could discern
from looking at these tariffs "the reasonable zone of
rates within which [they] would be charged.""
Again, AT&T protested. The statute, AT&T
pointed out, requires tariffs to "show[] all
charges. 0 9 Again, the Court of Appeals agreed and
reversed the FCC.7 0 This presumably will be the
end of the matter. As both the D.C. Circuit and Su-
preme Courts observed, the FCC must address its
concerns to Congress if it believes that the statute
represents an outmoded policy.
III. THE STATUS OF THE RELATIONSHIP
TODAY
For the most part, Congress seems to have
achieved what it wanted in 1927 from the relation-
ship between the FCC and the D.C. Circuit. The
Court serves as a vigorous counterbalance to the
enormous administrative power wielded by the Com-
mission. The Court's special zeal in FCC cases is
nurtured by two unusual factors. First, the Court
possesses a striking familiarity with FCC matters.
Observers see this familiarity in action at almost any
oral argument in an FCC case. The Court gains this
knowledge because of the great number of FCC
4 Id. at 1192, 1195-96
5 There were two of these cases. The first was reported.
AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S.Ct. 3020 (1993). The second was not reported.
AT&T v. FCC, No. 92-1628 (June 4, 1993). The Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the second case.
" MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 114 S.Ct.
2223 (1994).
67 Id. at 2230.
" Tariff Filing Requirements for Nondominant Common
Carriers, order, 8 FCC Red 6752, para. (1993).
I9 d. para.




cases it hears and because of the longevity of its
judges. Most D.C. Circuit judges serve far longer
than do FCC Commissioners. Thus, by the time
they retire, many D.C. Circuit judges have spent
more time on FCC matters than many
Commissioners.
The Court's familiarity with FCC matters clearly
affects the way it perceives FCC actions. From the
Supreme Court's vantage point, FCC actions may
well be grounded in the agency expertise which that
Court so often invokes as a reason for deference.
From where the D.C. Circuit sits, the FCC's exper-
tise is very much exaggerated. Every week, the D.C.
Circuit reviews FCC decisions drafted by staff per-
sonnel who may have graduated only recently from
professional school, and approved by Commissioners
who, historically at least, have often had little prior
experience in communications matters. Year in and
year out, the Court sees the FCC repeat the same
mistakes of policy and law. Judges on the Court
would not be human if they did not believe that they
could improve upon the FCC's results.
A second factor that fosters special zeal by the
Court in FCC cases is the Court's heavy administra-
tive case load. In fiscal year 1993, for example, 1,791
appeals were filed with the D.C. Circuit. Fully 838,
or fourty-seven percent, of these were appeals from
administrative decisions. In all circuit courts com-
bined, in contrast, only 3,938 of 50,224, or eight per-
cent, of all appeals were from administrative deci-
sions." Administrative appeals are by far the
dominant category of appeals in the D.C. Circuit.
This predominance of administrative cases gives
the D.C. Circuit an institutional interest in reversing'some proportion of agency decisions. Suppose instead
that the Court began regularly to affirm a high pro-
portion of agency decisions. It would soon gain a
reputation among potential appellants as hostile ter-
ritory. Many of those appellants would either forego
their appeals altogether or file them in other circuits,
reducing significantly the D.C. Circuit's case load.
Perhaps even more importantly, because administra-
tive cases are a primary source of its unique impor-
tance, the Court would suffer a corresponding loss of
prestige. FCC cases are among the most prominent
administrative appeals, so the Court's institutional
interest is unusually strong in those cases.
The Court's own attitude is not, however, the only
factor that affects the rate at which it reverses the
FCC. On the other side of the equation is the FCC
" Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Judi-
cial Business of the United States Courts: Annual Report of the
itself. The quality of its decisions-their consistency
internally and with prior decisions, their adherence
to statutory requirements, the strength of reasoning
in their opinions-determines whether those deci-
sions will, in particular cases, be affirmed. This side
of the equation, I believe, accounts primarily for the
interesting cycles over time in the proportion of FCC
decisions reversed by the Court of Appeals. Those
cycles are shown on Table I at the appendix. Table
I concerns decisions published with opinions by the
D.C. Circuit in FCC cases from 1960 to 1993.
As the table shows, there have been two distinctive
large-scale cycles in the rate at which the D.C.
Circuit has reversed the FCC. The first cycle began
in 1960 and ended in 1979. The second began in
1980 and appears now to be winding down. Each
cycle in turn breaks down into three periods. It be-
gins with a period in which the FCC is consistently
affirmed each year in a high proportion of its cases.
Thus, the FCC was reversed in fewer than 35% of
appeals from 1960 to 1964 and again from 1980 to
1984. Next, the FCC is reversed in a high (above
35) percentage of its cases in every third or second
year. This pattern prevailed from 1965 to 1975 and
again, more or less, from 1985 to 1989. Finally, the
FCC is consistently reversed in a high proportion of
its cases each year. This pattern prevailed from 1976
through 1979 and again from 1990 through 1993.
What accounts for these cycles? I believe that they
result largely from learned behavioral responses by
the FCC. At the beginning of the cycle, the FCC is
consistently affirmed. After several years of this, the
FCC starts to believe that it can do no wrong. It
tests the limits of its discretion and becomes sloppy
in the way it approaches legal prerequisites. A pe-
riod follows in which the agency is reversed fre-
quently, but intermittently. In these periods, the
FCC hesitantly apprehends that discretion has lim-
its. It vacillates between fixing the problems and ig-
noring them. When the Court rewards it only inter-
mittently for its tentative efforts, the FCC comes to
believe that the Court affirms only randomly, con-
veying no fixed reward for good behavior. A period
follows in which the FCC, perceiving no reward,
pays little attention to legal prerequisites, basing de-
cisions primarily on policy alone. This produces a
period of consistent reversal by the Court of Appeals.
In turn, the FCC reforms its behavior, and the cycle
begins again.
Table I appears to show that the rate at which the
Director, AI-3 (1993) (Table B-1).
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D.C. Circuit has reversed the FCC has gradually in-
creased over time. This appearance is deceptive. The
table is, of necessity, compiled from decisions accom-
panied by published opinions. Information about un-
published decisions over this period is too unreliable
to be compiled in a similar format. The Court has,
however, increasingly relied upon unpublished dis-
positions. The overwhelming majority of these dispo-
sitions are affirmances. Thus, after accounting for
cyclical variations, the overall rate at which the FCC
has been affirmed has remained relatively constant
from 1960 to the present.
Indeed, I believe, on an absolute scale that the
Court today grants the FCC substantially more dis-
cretion than it did in earlier decades. The Court rou-
tinely affirms FCC decisions now that it would
likely have reversed in the 1960s and 1970s. Com-
pare, for example, Russian River Vintage Broadcast-
ing v. FCC,72 with Natick Broadcast Associates, Inc.
v. FCC,73 and National Cable Television Associa-
tion, Inc. v. FCC and USA, 74 with Hawaiian Tele-
phone Co. v. FCC and USA. 7 1 In Russian River, a
recent case, the Court affirmed the FCC's dismissal
of a broadcast application because the information
on a map in the application was not set out in the
prescribed manner. In Natick, a 1967 case, the
Court reversed after the FCC dismissed a broadcast
application because the applicant originally submit-
ted erroneous information, later corrected, showing a
prohibited overlap. The Court huffed: "We think the
Commission's action was hypertechnical and arbi-
trary." No similar sentiment would likely be uttered
today.
In Hawaiian Telephone, in 1974, the Court re-
versed the FCC's grant of a certificate of convenience
and necessity to provide a new private line service
between Hawaii and the mainland. The FCC failed,
the Court explained, to justify its assumption that
competition was necessarily in the public interest. In
NCTA, in 1994, the FCC made the same assump-
tion in adopting a policy to authorize certificates of
public convenience and necessity to telephone compa-
nies so that they could provide video dial tone service
in competition with cable television companies. The
lawfulness of this assumption was not even chal-
lenged on appeal, the Court cited the FCC's compe-
tition rationale with approval, and it affirmed.
The greater liberty given by the Court to the FCC
today has not been reflected, however, in declining
rates of reversal. Why not? The FCC has taken full
72 5 F.3d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
73 385 F.2d 985 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
advantage of its greater discretion, and has continued
to press at the margins of its allowed discretion.
Thus, even as the court has expanded the boundaries
of what it considers acceptable, the total proportion
of FCC decisions outside these boundaries has re-
mained about the same.
One factor that has relatively little im-
pact-popular belief notwithstanding-on the rate of
reversal is the political philosophies of the individual
judges. A judge's political philosophy may affect the
kinds of cases in which she or he votes to reverse, but
it does not, for the most part, affect the overall pro-
portion of such cases. Table II at the appendix
shows votes by individual D.C. Circuit judges to re-
verse or affirm the FCC, covering decisions with
published opinions in the two year period from Oc-
tober 1, 1992, through September 30, 1994. The ta-
ble shows that judges nominated by Democratic
Presidents (R.B. Ginsburg, Mikva, Wald, Edwards,
and Rogers) voted to reverse about half the time.
The same is true of most judges (Silberman, Buck-
ley, Williams, Sentelle and Randolph) nominated by
Republican Presidents. Only two Republican nomi-
nated judges (D.H. Ginsburg and Henderson) were
fairly consistent in voting to affirm the FCC.
For judges nominated by Presidents of both par-
ties, then, Table II shows a relatively high propor-
tion of votes to reverse. These proportions reflect the
last stage of the large scale cycle, discussed above,
through which the Court and the FCC are now go-
ing. This last stage is also reflected on Table III,
showing all contested dispositions from October 1,
1992, through September 30, 1994. In this period,
the D.C. Circuit has decided forty two FCC cases
with opinions, twenty three times affirming and
nineteen times reversing. Thus, in these cases, the
Court has reversed forty-five percent of the time.
That percentage is substantially higher than the av-
erage reversal rate shown on Table I, i.e. thirty-four
percent.
This phenomenon is tempered, however, when de-
cisions without opinions are considered. The Court
affirmed without opinion in nineteen cases in the pe-
riod reflected on Table III. Overall, then, the Court
has reversed the FCC in this period in only thirty
one percent of its cases. That percentage is probably
still higher than the comparable rate for the thirty
three year period. The disparity is probably not as
great, however, as when only decisions with opinions
are considered. That is so because, as noted above,
74 33 F.3d. 66 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
76 498 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the Court has made its decisions without opinion
more frequently in recent years. In these compari-
sons, reversals without opinion are not counted be-
cause they actually reflect the precedential impact of
only one or two recent decisions with opinions. Affir-
mances without opinion, in contrast, generally in-
volve consideration of the merits of the individual
cases.
One final trend is also clear from Table III. The
overwhelming majority of appeals today are taken to
the D.C. Circuit. In the recent period reflected in the
table, the D.C. Circuit disposed of 101 appeals from
FCC decisions. All other circuits combined disposed
of only fourteen such appeals. Perhaps half of FCC
appeals must be taken to the D.C. Circuit, of course,
because they involve radio licensing. But these num-
bers show that even in other types of cases, where
appellants do have a choice, the vast majority choose
the D.C. Circuit. This trend is certainly abetted by
the assessments prospective appellants make as to
where their appeals are most likely to succeed.
While the D.C. Circuit reversed in forty five percent
of its FCC cases decided with opinions, all other cir-
cuits reversed in only twenty nine percent of such
cases.
Prospective appellants do not, however, base these
assessments only on their perceptions about the
courts' relative propensities to reverse. The D.C.
Circuit's far greater knowledge of FCC matters, and
its vast body of administrative law precedent, enable
appellants to focus their briefs much more precisely
on critical arguments. Appellants sometimes prevail
for this reason in the D.C. Circuit, when they would
not elsewhere. When they do, the Court's special
role in FCC matters serves a profound public inter-
est; justice is achieved that would otherwise be lost.
And that result is very much what Congress had in
mind when it laid the groundwork for the special
relationship.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between the FCC and the D.C.
Circuit is, as we have seen, an evolving one. Its con-
tinuing evolution in the last years of the millennium
will be interesting to watch. One factor especially
worth. watching will be the role of the Supreme
Court. Three former D.C. Circuit judges now sit
there. They have thus far tended to employ tradi-
tional D.C. Circuit responses in FCC matters. In
both major communications cases last term, for ex-
ample, all three favored positions identical to those
long taken by the D.C. Circuit. In MCI Telecom-
munications Corp. v. AT&T,"' they joined the ma-
jority; in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC,71 they dissented. If this pattern holds, the Su-
preme Court's traditional role as FCC champion
may be weakened. And future FCC Chairman will
ruefully conclude that the D.C. Circuit's power of
review is productive of even more mischief.
76 114 S.Ct. 2223 (1994).
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